In the face of a government that has become highly corrupted by the influence of moneyed interests, many think holding a convention to amend our Constitution would be the most promising mechanism of reform. At first glance, this makes a great deal of sense: the scenario in which we find ourselves — at the mercy of a legislative process administered by elected “representatives” who are unresponsive to popular will or public interest — seems to embody exactly what our founding fathers hoped to protect against by including in our Constitution the people’s power to amend it.

But while a constitutional convention might be an elegant solution to our problems, legally and theoretically speaking, in the context of our current political reality, it is not the most practical avenue of reform.

Primarily, this is because of the way a constitutional convention must be initiated. According to Article V of the Constitution, which concerns amendments, Congress must call a constitutional convention if two-thirds of the state legislatures petition it to do so. Leaving aside the fact that two-thirds amounts to 34 states, an ambitious number, it is crucial to emphasize that the call for a convention must be initiated by the states’ legislatures, not their citizens.

To put it bluntly, what this means is that reforming our corrupt electoral system by way of a constitutional convention requires us to depend on people who themselves came to power via corrupt electoral systems. When the framers wrote Article V, they surely expected state legislatures to be much more immune to corruption than Congress, by virtue of their closer proximity to the citizenry, making them reliable barometers of when the Constitution needed amending.

The unfortunate reality is that today, the vast majority of state legislatures aren’t much more representative than Congress itself; indeed, state legislators share the congressional appetite for big checks from wealthy special interests. And lest we forget, service in the state legislature is oftentimes a launching pad for congressional campaigns.

So what is it exactly that makes us think our state legislatures will square off against moneyed interests to stand up for the people?

For the sake of argument, let’s imagine that 34 state legislatures are willing to call for a convention. There’s an even larger obstacle still standing in our way: any proposed amendment must be approved by three-quarters (38) of the states.

To be clear, this problem runs deeper than merely having to win the support of an additional four states. In short, there’s a very good chance that even some of the states originally calling for a convention wouldn’t approve of its proposal.

Here’s why: While it’s generally accepted that, in order for Congress to call a convention, there must be (at least loose) agreement among the petitioning states with regard to the topic to be addressed by a convention, once a constitutional convention is called, it’s not at all clear that its scope can be limited to said topic, since at that point the matter is out of the hands of Congress.

So basically, there’s a very real possibility that a constitutional convention will result in a proposed constitutional amendment that drifts from the states’ original convention-calling intent. This is why so many people are scared of constitutional conventions: they’re afraid the convention will overreach its intended scope.

In reality, though, this isn’t why we should be scared — at least not those of us who share a will for reform. We should be scared of a convention because, looking realistically at the way our politics work, an amendment that drifts even slightly in scope from what the states originally called for will be rejected by the states. And considering the nature of political dialogue and compromise, scope drift is probable, meaning that so too is the refusal of states to approve a convention’s proposal. The result: a whole lot of democratic energy (i.e., the energy it took to get us to the point of calling a convention) down the drain.

But again, for the sake of argument, let’s imagine that a convention is called and it proposes an amendment that’s perfectly reflective of the 34 states’ original intent in calling it. There are two reasons why there’s still a very real likelihood that the amendment won’t get approved.

One is that we would have to win the support of an additional four states, and that’s no easy task. But a more substantive reason is that, for every single one of the 38 states whose approval we’d need, again, it’s not the people of those states who’d be approving it.

There are two ways a proposed amendment can be approved by the states, and Congress gets to choose between them. One is by the state legislatures. I’ve already discussed why this is problematic, but it would be even more problematic at this stage of the game. When a state legislature calls for a convention, it’s nothing more than a symbolic gesture. Its members aren’t committing to anything; they’re paying lip service to an idea.

On the contrary, when it comes time to approve a proposed amendment, state legislators stand to alter the law of the land, which they know will ultimately come back around to affect them. In short, it’s the difference between making a campaign promise and actually voting to pass a bill. Like voting to pass a bill, approving a proposed amendment is where the rubber meets the road, and it’s safe to say that a substantial number of state legislators — even those who supported calling a convention — aren’t going to be willing to do it. Of course, they’ll hang their hat on technical reasons why not, but at the end of the day, it will be because it’s just not in their interest.

The other way a proposed amendment can be approved by states is through state conventions called specifically for the purpose of deciding whether or not to grant approval. Initially, this seems like a more hopeful option, but it’s really not. Each state has its own rules about how a state convention would come into being. For some, it would just be members of the state legislature. At the other end of the spectrum, some states would hold a special election of delegates, for which any citizen would be eligible to run. This sounds exciting, but here’s the catch: you can bet your bottom dollar that wealthy donors will come out of the woodwork to influence the outcome of any election like this. They’ll do everything in their power to make sure a convention is packed with delegates who will come to the table ready to do their business.

The moral of all of this: Even if we succeed in calling a constitutional convention, which would be no small feat, there’s a good chance that whatever comes out of it will never be approved.

Now, for some people, the point of advocating for a constitutional convention isn’t actually to make a convention happen; it’s to get enough states to call for a convention that a credible threat is produced, thereby scaring Congress into passing an amendment itself. I used to belong to this school of thought. Lately, though, I’ve really come to question it. Here’s why: First and foremost, a credible threat will still be absurdly hard to produce. Consider the fact that 17 states have called for a convention to pass a balanced budget amendment. Has anyone seen realistic action toward a balanced budget amendment?

Part of what makes any action Congress has taken less than realistic is that, to pass an internally proposed amendment, there needs to be consent among two-thirds of both the House and the Senate. At a time when we can’t even get bills promoting better disclosure to overcome a filibuster in the Senate (which is a lower threshold to overcome than two-thirds!), we’re never going to see real, substantive reform of our electoral system pass a floor vote.

But here’s a much more serious flaw in the “credible threat” strategy: Is an amendment written by Congress really what we want? When was the last time Congress passed truly good legislation? Won’t whatever they produce just be watered down and loophole-ridden? The whole point of our movement is that we need reform because we can no longer trust Congress. Why should we trust them to rectify the basis of our distrust?

We need to stop wasting valuable political energy advocating for this strategy. It’s high time we take matters into our own hands.